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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Recent Takings Clause Decisionsand the Police Power
The police power has been steadily losing ground to the Takings Clause 2 in
recent Supreme Court decisions. The Takings Clause now requires interim
compensation when a regulation of land turns out to be a taking.3 This
requirement may induce state and local governments to forego valid regulation
through zoning laws rather than risk payment of interim compensation for
good faith enactments that are later held unconstitutional. The Takings Clause
4
may also prove hostile to rent control under ordinary conditions in peacetime.
Further, a requirement for a donation of a small strip of land to protect public
rights in the use of the beach from the encroaching use of beachfront owners
who seek a large increase in the use of their lots has also been struck down.5 In
retrospect, at least, this decision may have signalled diminished police power
protection for public ecological resources.
In a recent Supreme Court case, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,6 the
Court addressed the issue of whether the common law of nuisance should
prohibit as well as authorize state regulation of property to some extent. The
common law of nuisance can be quite protective of landowners who want to
make a destructive use of their land. It allows destructive land use provided it
is not a common law nuisance. It is not surprising, then, that landowners who
would like to make a destructive use of their land have asked the Supreme
Court more than once to make this common law right to use land a
constitutional right.
These requests were made randomly during the second and third decades
of the present century, and all of them were unsuccessful. 7 Throughout these

2

The pertinent language of the amendment states: "[nlor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. v.
3

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
322 (1987).
4
See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). The Court dismissed a Takings
Clause challenge to hardship tenant provisions in a municipal rent control ordinance
because it was premature. Id. at 15. Justices Scalia and O'Connor dissented, however,

on the ground that the hardship provisions violated the Takings Clause. They also
thought that only emergency conditions that involved exorbitant prices would justify
rent control. Id. at 20.
5

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829, 838-39, 853 (1987).

6112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
7

1n Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), a landowner unsuccessfully resisted
regulatory shutdown of his brick factory on the ground that it was not a common law
nuisance, Id. at 406, 410. Regulatory destruction of red cedar trees that had rust disease
which was fatal to apple orchards, although harmless to the host trees, elicited a similar
claim in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1928); cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (presenting a challenge of a real estate broker to
zoning regulations that drastically reduced the value of some of his holdings, thereby
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years, a Supreme Court that cannot be justly accused of unfriendliness toward
8
private enterprise and property rights flatly turned down all of these requests.
What has been withheld for a century, however, may yet become a
constitutional right.9
Thus, a regulation that totally deprives a landowner of all productive use of
his land becomes unique, requiring a unique rule. 10 Near nuisance precedents,
on the other hand, become harmful use precedents.11 A harmful use, in turn,
becomes harmful only in the eye of the beholder, allowing an equally opposite
12
perspective that the use is really harmless.
Further, harmful use precedents that allowed the state to make the survival
choice between two incompatible uses now mean something less than they
obviously imply. These precedents, however, may involve only the traditional
subject matter of the police power.13 Subject matter that departs from tradition,
therefore, may deserve a different degree of protection from the police power
or perhaps none at all. 14 The issue is left to two conflicting possibilities of what
constitutes a nuisance. 15
Whichever of these two possibilities prevails, both possibilities require the
courts to perform essentially legislative functions regardless, in other words,
of whether public ecological resources receive insufficient or ample protection
from private enterprise that wants to consume them. The traditional Takings
Clause precedents, on the other hand, would give public ecological resources

impliedly asserting constitutional freedom from drastic property regulation when a
land use is not a nuisance).
8

At that time, the nation had a laissez faire regime of constitutional law. The market

was the virtual regulator of rents, wages and prices. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543, 546-48 (1924) (holding ordinary peacetime rent control unconstitutional);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding wage controls
unconstitutional); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (holding price
control unconstitutional), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). Price
control was permissible only for a business affected with a public interest, Id. at 239-40.
See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8-4, at 570-74 (2d ed.
1981). Congress' commerce power did not extend to labor relations in the mines, mills
and factories of the nation. See Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 269 (1918), overruled
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
9

See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

10

See infra pp. 36-37.

11

See infra pp. 36-38.

12

See infra pp. 39-41.

13See infra pp. 50-51.
14See infra pp. 46-48.
15 See infra pp. 46-48.
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and private property ample protection with minimum judicial oversight. 16 The
traditional position seems preferable for this reason.
B. An Overview of Lucas-The Factsand Court Litigation
Lucas was a building contractor who lived in a subdivision on the Isle of
Palms, a barrier island east of Charleston, South Carolina. 17 He also owned two
of the last four vacant lots in the subdivision. 18 Extensive residential
development had already occurred on the island.19
South Carolina had enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act in 1977 to
protect the beach-dune system of the seashore from residential development
close to the beach. 20 Initially, the Act required a permit for a change of land use
in the critical area along the beach, which included the beach as well as
immediately adjacent sand dunes. 21 Lucas' two vacant lots were inland to the
critical area on the island when he acquired them, and the Act's permit
requirement did not apply to his lots at that time. 22
The initial Act, however, did not stop the loss of shoreline.23 Consequently,
the initial Act was amended by the Beachfront Management Act which moved
the baseline of the critical area along the beach landward placing the baseline
within Lucas' property lines.2 4 The new baseline of the critical area for Lucas'
lots was determined by connecting the most landward points of erosion in the
property's inlet erosion zone during the preceding forty years.2 5 The amended
Act prohibited Lucas from placing any habitable structure on his lots, and it
provided no exception from the ban. 26

The Beachfront Management Act recited more than one reason for protection
of the beach-dune system. 27 The system, for example, protected life and
property by serving as a storm barrier.28 Further, the Act declared that
residential development along the beach accelerated the erosion of the beaches

16

See infra pp. 36-38.

7

1 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889, 2905.
18

1d. at 2905.

19

1d. at 2889.

20

1d. at 2889, 2904-05.

21

Id.at 2889.

22112 S. Ct. at 2889.
23

1d. at 2905.

24

1d. at 2889.

25

1d. at

26

1d. at 2889-90.

2889 n.1.

27112 S.Ct. at 2896,n.10.
28

1d. at 2896.
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and dunes. 29 The Act also said that the beach-dune system protected public use
of the beaches, 30 the state's tourist industry,31 and habitats for endangered and
threatened species.3 2
The Act also declared that it was necessary to let the beach accrete and erode
in its natural cycle and that discouraging new construction and encouraging
the withdrawal of structures that were already too near the beach were
necessary to accomplish this objective.33 If existing structures were destroyed,
the Act would not permit rebuilding. 34 The Act also fobade repairing
seawalls, 35 and required some owners of existing structures to replenish the
36
beach with sand annually.
Time and tide alike had affected Lucas' land over the years; the land was
once part of the beach. 37 In 1963, the land was under water.38 Lucas purchased
the lots for $975,000 two years before he was prohibited from building homes
39
upon them.
Lucas sued for compensation due to a permanent taking of his land.4 0 He
claimed that because the Beachfront Management Act,4 1 as amended, deprived
him of all productive use of his land, he was entitled to compensation
regardless of whether the Act furthered legitimate objectives of the police
power.4 2 The state trial court agreed and awarded him judgment in the amount
of $1,232,387.50.43
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, understood Lucas to
concede that the Act furthered its objectives and, therefore, was a valid exercise
of the police power.44 Consequently, the court applied the harmful or noxious

29[d.
30

1d.

311d.
32112 S. Ct. at 2896.
33

Id.

34

1d. at 2924

35

1d.

36

1d.

37112 S. Ct. at 2905.
38Id.
39

1d. at 2889.

40

1d. at 2890.

41

S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10, 280(A)(1), (2) (Law Co-op 1988).

42112 S. Ct. at 2890.
43

Id.

44

1d.
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use precedents of the Takings Clause. 45 These precedents allow the state to
prohibit private use of land when it harms interests within the protective scope

of the police power without paying the private landowner compensation for

the ensuing drastic regulatory loss. 46 Therefore, the court reversed the trial
47
court's judgment for Lucas.
The United States Supreme Court viewed the case differently than both of
the state courts. A majority of five judges,48 including Justice White, minted a
new rule for the Takings Clause. The Court held that a total regulatory use
deprivation of land requires compensation unless the prohibited use was
antecedently proscribable under state nuisance or similar principles of
property law. 49 In other words, a landowner has a constitutional right to make
use of his land, even if it is destructive of public ecological resources, when it
is the only available productive use of his land and the use is not a nuisance.
Thus, the newly minted rule is a per se takings rule for total use deprivation
50
with a per se nuisance exception.
Four justices refused to join the Court's majority opinion and agree with its
rule. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens dissented, insisting upon a straight-

45

Id.

46

Id.

47112 S. Ct. at 2890.
48
49

1d.
d. at 2899-2901.

501d. at 2901. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) held that a total regulatory use deprivation of land is
constitutional if it furthers an objective of the police power. The Court assumed,
arguendo, that an interim floodplain ordinance deprived the landowner of all use of his
land. Id. at 307,313, 322. The Court then said that it had no occasion to decide "whether
the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by
establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as part of the State's authority to
enact safety regulations." Id. at 313. At this juncture in the opinion, the Court did not
mention nuisance at all, but instead cited the harmful use precedents. Id. At the end of
the opinion, the Court ruled that invalidation of the ordinance would require interim
compensation. Id. at 322.
Some recent cases do contain a statement that a taking occurs when a regulation
denies the landowner economically viable use of his land. See Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470,495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264,295-96 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980). Seealso
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6. But see Keystone, 480 U.S. 485 (containing a proposition that
contradicted this statement). Further, Hodel was decided six years before FirstEnglish,
but like Nollan, which was decided seventeen days after First English, it simply repeated
the statement as it appeared in Agins and an earlier case. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834, and
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96. Further, this statement, itself, was unqualified. Lucas added a
qualifier, namely, a nuisance exception. The Lucas rule is brand new. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2911, n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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forward application of the harmful use precedents. 51 Justice Souter voted to
dismiss the case on the ground that the request to review it had been
improvidently granted. 52 He explained that the assumptions that provided the
basis for decision in the case throughout the litigation did not provide enough
facts to mark out any dimensions for the new rule. 53 Finally, Justice Kennedy
wrote a brief concurring opinion that did not subscribe to the new rule.54 He
did say, nevertheless, that the promotion of the state's tourist industry did not
justify the drastic regulatory imposition upon Lucas. 55
C. The Result of Lucas: Uncertainty
As a result of Lucas, uncertainty exists as to whether this nuisance rule will
come to have an inflexible or flexible approach in determining what constitutes
nuisance. 56 An inflexible approach could hold some exercises of the state's
police power to only a marginal increase beyond what the common law, strictly
applied, would permit.5 7 A flexible approach toward nuisance, on the other
hand, might allow the police power to give public ecological resources as much
protection as its traditional subjects.58
Justice White, who was part of the five-judge majority in Lucas, may be the
reason for this uncertainty in the scope of the nuisance rule. 59 He finds an
inflexible conception of nuisance unacceptable, in view of his position in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis;60 the four other justices in the
Lucas majority, however, may prefer an inflexible approach to nuisance as it
reduces the police power.6 1 The holding in Keystone allowed Pennsylvania to
compel the coal industry to leave 27,000,000 tons of coal in the ground to spare

51

Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904, 2910-12, 2917, 2920-22.

52

d. at 2925.

53
54
55

d. at 2925-26.
hd. at 2902-03.
1d. at 2904.

56112 S. Ct. at 2904.
57
58

Id.
1d. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, did not seem to read the court's opinion to

foreclose a conception of nuisance that would adequately accommodate the regulatory
needs of the state to address conflicts between private land uses and new enlarged
interests of the police power. 112 S. Ct. at 2912-14. The outlook of Justice Stevens in this
regard, however, was dismal. He said: "Under the court's opinion today, however, if a
state should decide to prohibit the manufacture of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable
firearms, for example, it must be prepared topay for the adverse economic consequences
of its decision." Id. at 2921.
59

Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888.

60480 U.S. 470 (1987); see infra pp. 43-46.
61

See infra pp. 43-46.
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the state's bituminous coal communities from a mining practice that would
destroy them. 62 The outlook of Justice White, then, may permit an expansion
of the nuisance element of the new Lucas rule, and the outlook of all four of the
63
justices who did not subscribe to the rule may be equally accommodating.
Still, the harmful use precedents underwent a transformation in Lucas which,
itself, is not necessarily remarkable. What is remarkable, however, is that the
64
harmful use precedents are Takings Clause precedents of great renown, and
that their basis is nuisance. It is possible to overlook the fact that the newly
minted rule in Lucas for the Takings Clause can rest upon nuisance rather than
harmful use. 65 It would seem impossible, though, to mint a new rule for the
Takings Clause that rests upon nuisance without mentioning that the rule
that also rests upon nuisance. But
appears to reject Takings Clause precedent
66
that is exactly what the Lucas Court did.
One might wonder, naturally, how constitutional law, at this late date, can
be in equipoise between a constitutional claim that has always been rejected
and a common police power argument that has always been acceptable. One
might guess that it is due, in part, to the remarkable susceptibility of precedents
to transformation and restructuring when the Supreme Court finds that these
precedents no longer serve the perceived needs of the times.
II. THE HARMFUL USE PRECEDENTS HAVE A NUISANCE RATIONALE THAT

PERMITS NEAR TOTAL REGULATORY USE DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
Mugler v. Kansas67 allowed the state to mandate liquor prohibition without
paying the liquor industry a cent for the prescribed uselessness of its distilleries,
breweries, and their fixtures. 68 The word nuisance pervasively appears
throughout the opinion. 69 Zoning regulation passed constitutional muster in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,7 0 and it also caused a 75% reduction

62480 U.S. at 498.
63

See infra pp. 43-46.

64

See RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 113-14, 120, 130-34 (1985).

65Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66

The Lucas majority did make two references to the South Carolina Supreme Court's
understanding of the harmful use precedents to permit proscription of a harmful use
that was tantamount to a public nuisance. 112 S. Ct. at 2890,2896-97. The Lucas majority,
however, did not say that these precedents rested upon a nuisance rationale. See infra
note 177 and accompanying text for the kind of analysis that the Court decided not to
mention or make, notwithstanding recent confirmation of its constitutional status in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492, 512-14 (1987).
67123 U.S. 623 (1887).
68

ht. at 657.

69ht. at 655-58, 669-70, 672-73.
70272 U.S. 365 (1926).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/4
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in value of some of the holdings of the real estate broker who challenged the
zoning law.71 He had acquired his holdings for industrial development, and
the zoning plan restricted much of his land to residential uses. 72 A real estate
developer does not create a nuisance simply by putting down factories on
undeveloped rural acreage, but nuisance is the basic, pervasive theme of
Euclid.73
Justice Sutherland, who spoke for the court in Euclid, explained that a
nuisance could be the right thing in the wrong place, "like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."74 Consequently, keeping factories and commercial
75
uses out of residential areas can be an exercise in nuisance prevention. The
76
law of nuisance provided the basis for this exclusion.
Similarly, apartment buildings did not belong in residential areas if the
government thought that a different location was more suitable. The Euclid
77
Court observed that an apartment house could become a mere parasite, that
one apartment frequently attracted another to an area "destroying the entire
section for private house purposes and that apartment houses frequently
monopolize the rays of the sun"78 and cause a lot of noise and traffic until finally
they come "very near to being nuisances." 79
Earlier, Hadachek v. Sebastian8 0 upheld imposition of a drastic regulatory
remedy for incompatible uses that zoning regulation might have avoided.
Hadachekpermitted the uncompensated shutdown of a brick factory when it
precluded residential development of nearby rural acreage. 81 The shutdown
82
deprived the owner of the brick factory of 92.5% of the value of his land. The
Court, nevertheless, held that the legislature can declare a preexisting lawful
83
business to be a "nuisance in law and fact" although it is not a nuisance per se.

71Id. at 384.
72

1d. at 385,389.

73

1d. at 387-88.

74

1d. at 388.

75272 U.S. at 388.
76
1d. at 388-89.
77

1d. at 394.

78Id.
79Id. at 395.

80239 U.S. 394 (1915).
81

1d. at 410.

82

1d. at 405.

83

1d. at 410-11.
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Similarly, Miller v. Schoene,84 another incompatible use case, permitted
Virginia to order destruction of red cedar trees without compensation when
they became infected with a rust disease and, thereby, fatal to nearby apple
orchards although the disease was harmless to the host tree. 85 The diseased
cedar trees were a threat to the state's apple industry. 86 The Court found the
"injury to property no more serious, nor the public interest less" than in
Hadachek.8 7 It also cited Hadachekfor the proposition that the Court did not have
to weigh with nicety the question of whether the diseased cedar trees were a
88
nuisance at common law or could be declared a nuisance by statute.
For the Lucas majority, however, the nuisance precedents became harmful
use precedents, and a harmful use became a use that was harmful only in the
eye of the beholder.89 Perhaps these changes would be a little easier to see,
however, if a totally regulatory use deprivation were unique. This situation
became unique and received a newly minted rule to address it.
III.

TOTAL REGULATORY USE DEPRIVATION-ITS UNIQUENEs.-REASONS FOR A

UNIQUE PROTECTIVE TAKINGS RULE

The Lucas Court thought that the nuisance or harmful use precedents were
different than the case before it. The harmful use precedents were not as
extreme. Unlike the situation in Lucas, they did not involve regulation that
deprived the landowner of all productive use of his land.90 The Court then gave
several reasons why a total regulatory use deprivation requires a different,
more protective rule. All of these reasons, however, seem unpersuasive.
The Court stated, for example, that total regulatory deprivation of land is
not simply an adjustment of the benefits and burdens of economic life, an
adjustment that secures an average reciprocity of advantage for everyone
concerned. 9 1 Similarly, the Court reasoned that such drastic regulation is not
consistent with the functional truth that government could hardly go on unless
92
it could reduce property values to some extent by general regulation.
Admittedly, all of these remarks are true. But the Court clearly knew, as its
precedents show, that an occasional near total regulatory destruction of
property values is necessary to prevent a land use from destroying other
property values that the state can protect.
84276 U.S. 272 (1928).
85

1d. at 278.

86

1d. at 279.

87

1d. at 280.

88

1d.

89 See text accompanying

notes 71-100.

90Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899, n.13 (1992).
91

1d. at 2894.

92Id.
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The Court also argued that from the perspective of the regulated landowner,
93
a total regulatory use deprivation is the equivalent of physical appropriation.
Even if this is true, the nuisance precedents show that a regulatory cure must
be strong enough to overcome the harm at which it is directed.
The Court then explained that total regulatory deprivation of land has a
heightened risk of impermissibly pressing private property into public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm. 94 If this is true, however, the
camouflage should be easy to see through.
Five years before Lucas, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,95 a
five-judge Court majority had no trouble seeing a state regulatory land grab
that the four dissenting justices could not see at all. 96 Nollan struck down a
donation requirement of a small strip of land along the beach to accommodate
the right of the public to use 97the beach with the conflicting rights of adjacent
beachfront property owners.
The Nollan Court also confirmed that the Takings Clause provides
landowners with enhanced protection from regulatory takings. Instead of a
rational basis test that might be too lenient and permissive of state regulation,
the Court held that a regulation that targets a small group for a regulatory
sacrifice must be substantially related to a substantial state objective. 98 The
Lucas rule, of course, may end up giving such landowners much more
protection than the Nollan rule.
Further, the Lucas Court's reasons for unique status for a total regulatory use
deprivation expressed only part of its dissatisfaction with the harmful use or
nuisance precedents. A double-barreled parting shot completed its critique.
The Lucas Court's final pronouncements did cast the harmful use precedents
in a new light. Like the rest of the Court's criticisms, however, these
pronouncements seemed to miss their target completely.
IV. HARMFUL USE-ITS ILLUSORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN HARM PREVENTION
AND BENEFITS CONFERMENT-ITS OBSTRUCTION OF VALUE-FREE JUDGMENT

The Lucas Court stated that the basic premise of the nuisance precedents was
harmful use.99 The Court reasoned, however, that the concept of harm was too
illusory to permit value-free judgments. 100 Therefore, the Court declared that

93

94

1d.

1d. at 2894-95.

95483 U.S. 825 (1987).
96

1d. at 825, 828-29, 838-39, 853.

97

1d.

98

1d. at 834-35 n.3.

99

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).

lOOId. at 2897-99.
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harm prevention cannot be used as a basis for determining when a regulation
of property is a taking of property.101
Thus, the Court concluded that almost everything is harmful to land in some
way because almost everything interferes to some extent with what other
persons want to do with their land. 10 2 Harmfulness in this sense, as the Court
explained, naturally, does not support a drastic regulatory reduction in the
value of property. This kind of harmfulness always exists and would always
permit the state to drastically regulate property without having to observe the
limitations of the Takings Clause. 103
The Court opined that whether the state is drastically regulating property to
prevent harm or, instead, to confer benefits often depends only upon the eye
of the beholder. 104 To illustrate, the Court cited two contradictory state
precedents that involved the issue of whether protection of the environment
permits the state to prohibit the owner of wetlands from filling them in without
paying him compensation. 0 5 The Court reasoned that the eye of the beholder
might see either harm prevention or ecological benefits in this situation. 106 The
Court concluded that the case before it was capable of creating the same
ambiguous impression. "One could say that imposing a servitude upon Lucas'
land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from 'harming' South
Carolina's ecological resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the benefits of
an ecological preserve."107
The Court continued with its discussion of the ambiguity in harm prevention
and added another dimension to it: it is really incorrect to describe a land use
as harmful merely because it is inconsistent with some other land use. 108 The
Court's reasoning in support of this position was that both uses can be perfectly
innocent and independently desirable although one of them must yield to the
other.109 "Whether Lucas' construction of single-family residences on his
parcels should be described as bringing a 'harm' to South Carolina's adjacent
ecological resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer
believes that the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important
that any adjacent use must yield.' 110

101Id. at 2899.
102

1d. at 2898.

103

1d. at 2899.

104112 S.Ct. at 2897.
105Id. at 2898.
106

d. at 2898.

107

d.

108

Id.

109112 S. Ct. at 2898.
110d.
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Moreover, the Court did not want to leave the conclusion to be drawn from
all of this ambiguity in the eye of the beholder, especially if the beholder was
the state legislature. After all, when a harmful use is not really harmful, then
harmful use cannot be a reason for drastic regulatory reduction in the value of
property. The Court stated:
[t]he distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and
that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern
on an objective value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that
noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish
regulatory "takings"-which require compensation-from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation. A fortiori the
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be a basis
for departing from our 1categorical rule that total regulatory takings
must be compensated.i
Although most of what the Court said is true, this reasoning does not support
the Court's conclusions. That almost everyone harms another, for example, by
simply getting in his way does not mean that this idea of harm is useless as a
basis for regulation. Instead, it frequently is the reason for laws of general
applicability to minimize some kinds of interference.
Further, the Court surely did not mean to suggest that it is usually impossible
to tell whether harm suppression occurs actually to suppress harm or to confer
benefits. In fact, harm suppression occurs to accomplish both objectives.
Abatement of a common law nuisance will benefit persons whom the nuisance
harmed. Harm suppression and benefits conferment naturally go
hand-in-hand.
Moreover, the Court's position about totally incompatible land uses that are
innocent and beneficial when independent of each other would perfectly fit
two of the well-known Takings Clause precedents. The cedar trees in Miller v.
Schoene,11 2 while infested with rust disease harmless to themselves, were
beneficial, except when they happened to be near apple orchards susceptible
to the disease. 113 The brick factory in Hadacheckv. Sebastian1 14 was beneficial all
by itself, but not when it precluded residential community development of the
surrounding countryside.1 1 5
The issue in such cases is, as the Lucas Court said, whether one use is of
enough importance to require the other use to yield to it. Still, only one use can
survive. Obviously, as the Court pointed out, it is impossible to make this
survival choice on a value-free basis.

lllld. at 2898-99.
112276 U.S. 272 (1928).
113

See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
114239 U.S. 394 (1915).
115See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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The survival choice will simply be value-laden, no matter who makes it.
Consequently, it would seem that making such choices should be exclusively
a legislative function. The Lucas rule, however, will permit the Supreme Court
to take these choices out of the hands of legislatures and make them itself. The
Court will have the final say upon whether a state's common law classifies a
total regulatory use deprivation as a nuisance with the requisite antecedent
116
clarity.
Moreover, the Lucas rule may deprive legislatures of regulatory freedom in
the future that the drastic regulation precedents permitted in the past. Still, the
new formulation in Lucas lacks content at the moment. 117 This lack of content
for a new rule that may reduce state regulatory power suggests a lack of
agreement on what its content should be. 118
The cause of this lack of agreement may be garnered from Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis,119 at least among the five-judge Lucas
coalition. Three, and perhaps more, judges in the Lucas majority probably want
to overrule Keystone and restore Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 12 0 to the full
precedential status that it had in the past.121
Keystone let the state of Pennsylvania compel the coal industry to leave
27,000,000 tons of coal in the ground to save the state's bituminous coal
communities from a destructive mining practice.122 Consequently, Keystone
might have enough clout to save the Atlantic beaches from destruction by
residential development. A full restoration of Mahon, on the other hand, might
well constitutionalize such destruction and, in the eye of the beholder, reduce
the police power of the state far more than occasional drastic property
regulation would reduce the rights of private property. Discussion of Mahon
and Keystone will show what is meant.
V. Two COAL CASES FROM PENNSYLVANIA AND ONE COAL CASE FOR THE

ATLANTIc BEACHES
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 123 the coal industry acquired the right to
mine coal beneath the anthracite communities in northeastern Pennsylvania,
but left ownership of the surface in homeowners and others. 124 The mining
rights included the right to mine away the coal support pillars that kept the
116See itfra pp. 52-53.
117
118

See infra pp. 45-47.
See infra pp. 45-46.

119480 U.S. 470 (1987).
120260 U.S. 393 (1922).

121See supra text accompanying notes 101-47.
122480 U.S. at 498.
123260 U.S. 393 (1922).
12 4/d. at 412-15.
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anthracite communities above ground. 125 Removal of these pillars involved
secondary or residual mining and also terminal mining for the coal
communities as well. 126 Thus, the properties on the land became threatened
with destruction and the value of the land plummeted.
The acquisition of these mining rights began well before the turn of the
century.127 Forty years later, terminal mining in the anthracite region was
occurring. 128 It is hardly surprising that the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
a law, the Kohler Act, to forbid the destructive mining practice that threatened
to destroy large areas of the state's land surface and also uproot a substantial
part of the state's population. 129 Equally without surprise was the coal
industry's challenge to the law on the ground that it was an uncompensated
taking of their property. In a characteristically brief and lucid opinion authored
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Court simply held that the coal
industry could keep what it bought and paid for.13°
The only plaintiffs in Mahon were the owners of a single house who sued to
131
enjoin mining operations that would cause it to subside into the ground.
Still, they did live in one of the cities for whose protection the challenged law
was enacted. 132 Further, the coal industry as well as state and local
governments participated in the case. 133 Consequently, the Court sensibly
treated the case as a constitutional challenge to the Kohler Act. 134
In ruling upon this challenge, it was relevant that the right to mine away the
surface support pillars had acquired the status of a separate estate in land under
Pennsylvania law. 135 This separate estate did not permit its owner to engage
in mining operations without the consent of the owner of the mineral estate,
although a coal company usually owned both the support and mineral
estates. 13 6 But the support estate could be sold by its owner to the owner of the
12 5Id.

126See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1978).
127260 U.S. at 412; cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
489(1987).
128Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
129

1d. at 412-13.

130

1d. at 414-15.

131

1d. at 412-13.

132

Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492 (Pa. 1922), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
133260 U.S. at 414.
134

Id.

1351d.; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 519-20
(1987).
136 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500-01.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

15

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:31

surface or mineral estate. 13 7 Thus, the Kohler Act was a total regulatory
deprivation of a preexisting estate in land. 138
The Court, therefore, proceeded to consider the purposes of the Act and
whether the police power justified this total regulatory deprivation of land use.
One purpose that the Act seemed to lack was the protection of any health
interests. Further, since the Act applied only when the land surface and mineral
rights were held in separate ownership, the Court concluded that
environmental protection, especially protection of the land surface, was not a
purpose of the Act.139 The Court also held that public safety could be secured
merely by giving timely notice of the intention to mine away the support
pillars, thereby permitting persons on the surface to depart in safety.140
Further, the argument of the surface owners and state and local governments
had alluded to the preservation of the anthracite communities.1 4 1 This allusion
was advisable, of course. Laissez faire was the constitutional law of the land at
the time,14 2 and a large regulatory sacrifice of coal industry property to provide
what would have been perceived as free living space and housing was a
constitutional claim that would have met certain death. To dispel any allusions,
the Court observed that peacetime rent control to provide for the immediate
aftermath of World War I, which had involved wartime rent control, went to
the verge of the law.143 Shortly after Mahon, the Court held that rent control in
ordinary peacetime would violate the Takings Clause. 144 The Mahon Court
itself said that the case before it went beyond the rent control cases that
involved war's aftermath. 145 Then, after having casually observed at the outset
of its opinion that the Kohler Act surely would have failed for lack of a public
purpose if its only purpose had been to protect the single house of the
plaintiffs, 146 the Court held the Act unconstitutional in its entirety.14 7
Some issues of constitutional law, however, do not rest easily once they have
been decided. An expansive role for government to provide for the general

1371d. at 579-80.
138260 U.S. at 414.
13 9
140

1d. at 413-14.
d. at 414.

14 1

d. at 409, 411 (presenting argument for Pennsylvania) (citing Mahon v.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492-93 (Pa. 1922)).
142 See supra note 8.

143260 U.S. at 416.
144Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546-48 (1924).
145260 U.S. at 416.
146

1d. at 414.

147

/d.
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welfare became acceptable in the decades following Mahon.148 Along with this
power came the recognized need to protect and conserve the environment.
That Mahon, itself, would be put to a test someday was inevitable. The test came
sixty-seven years later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Associationv. De Benedictis.149
It involved the same terminal, destructive mining practice as Mahon.
The protective legislation in Keystone, however, did not have quite the same
coverage as that in Mahon.150 Further, the law in Keystone protected streams,
impoundments, and aquifers; 1 51 and it also forbade removal of the coal support
pillars for the surface without state permission when both interests were held
in common ownership. 152 Apart from these differences, however, the two cases
were the same except that Keystone arose in Pennsylvania's bituminous coal
region. The purpose of the challenged laws in both cases was to protect
Pennsylvania's coal communities from destructive terminal mining
operations.
The coal industry, naturally, invoked Mahon1 53 and it must have been
surprised when the Keystone Court held that Mahon had only decided a very
insignificant point of law instead of providing the controlling law in Keystone.
This lackluster ruling in Mahon was that a regulatory destruction of mining
rights to protect merely a single house does not have a valid public purpose. 154
The rest of the Mahon opinion was said to have been advisory only.155
This cavalier treatment of Mahon reduced Justice Holmes' precedential
pronouncements about what the coal industry had bought, paid for, and could
keep to the status of dignified commentary. Four dissenting Keystone justices
14 8 Minimum wage legislation was held constitutional in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) which overruled Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923). Price regulation became constitutional in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
531-32, 540-42 (1934). Subsequently, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244-247 (1941)
overruled Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929). Williams had invalidated
price regulation for gasoline. In 1983, approximately ten per cent of the nation's rental
housing was subject to rent control. See Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelinesfor Drafting Rent
Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 725 n.1 (1983). Fourteen years
earlier,Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d. 560,567 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,400 U.S. 841 (1970),
dismissed a constitutional challenge to the rent control program of New York City in a
single paragraph. Eventually, Congress' commerce power reached small industry,
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17, 123 (1941), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); small farms, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,114 (1942);
and arson of a single two-unit apartment building, Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858,

859 (1985).
149480 U.S. 470 (1987).
150

1d. at 485-86.

1511d. at 477.
152

1d. at 486.

153

1d. at 481.

154480 U.S. at 483-84.
155

1d. at 484.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

17

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:31

protested this mutilation of Mahon in vain;156 they were unable to see any
important differences in purpose between the challenged laws in the two
cases. 157 However, after the Keystone Court had sufficiently distinguished
Mahon, it was able to write on a clean slate.
The Keystone Court then proceeded to reason that the challenged law
protected valid objectives of the police power, namely, public health, safety, and
the environment. 158 The preservation of the bituminous coal communities
from a destructive mining practice also became a valid objective of the police
power.159 Therefore, the Keystone Court found these objectives lacking in
Mahon, and it also thought that the protected interests in Keystone were different
than the interests that the coal industry in Mahon had settled by contract and
title deeds fairly made and executed.
The coal industry in Keystone, of course, also complained about its enormous
regulatory loss of coal. 160 The industry, however, did not attempt to show to
what extent the loss might affect profitable operations. 161 The calculations that
would have been required for this purpose were complicated,1 62 and the
industry, naturally, thought it had strong precedent in Mahon on its side to
support its facial challenge to a law that destroyed its right to mine away
support pillars for surface land. The Keystone Court ruled, however, that
profitable mining operations must be presumed, absent data to the contrary,
and that regulatory loss to promote police power objectives was consistent with
163
the Takings Clause when the regulation permitted profitable operations.
The regulatory loss of coal in Keystone was about 27,000,000 tons although
the Court accurately said that it was less than 2% of the coal in place. 164 The
Court's emphasis upon loss of a small percentage rather than a large tonnage
would have been relevant if the coal industry had only been using its property
in a way that interfered with the ownership rights of the surface owners. The
surface estate, however, was a limited estate. Colloquially, it was a collapsible
fee simple interest. Therefore, a collapse did not deprive the surface owners of
any property interests.
One can justifiably argue, nevertheless, that because of its impact upon the
public, the police power should always be able to prohibit the fulfillment of an
arrangement like that in Keystone, regardless of how it would affect profitable
156

1d. at 507-08.

157

1d. at 509-511.
1d. at 485-86, 488.

158

159480 U.S. at 488.
160
161

d. at 498.
1d. at 493.

162Id.

163Id. at 495-96, 499, 501-02.
164480 U.S. at 496, 498.
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mining operations. But Keystone did not say this, and Mahon announced the
opposite position.165 In other words, Keystone simply straddled the middle
between two extremes. The nature and magnitude of the impact of residual
mining would have been the same in Keystone and Mahon. Both cases also
involved the support estate for the surface. Consequently, the small percent of
regulatory loss in Keystone does not distinguish it from Mahon.
Finally, the Keystone Court emphasized another difference between Mahon
and itself. The difference was that the Kohler Act in Mahon made some mining
operations commercially unprofitable, 166 a circumstance that appeared
incidental to the Mahon Court. 167 What this supposed difference ignores,
nevertheless, is that the laws in both cases made terminal mining operations
unprofitable. Further, there was no showing in Mahon that terminal mining was
necessary for profitable anthracite mining, although the support pillars may
have comprised one-third of the coal in an anthracite field.168 Thus, Keystone,
without distinguishing Justice Holmes' dignified commentary in Mahon,
technically left open the issue of whether the total uncompensated regulatory
destruction of property in furtherance of police power objectives violates the
Takings Clause. 169
This was also the issue that the Lucas Court found itself free to decide
without, however, mentioning the dignified commentary in Mahon that had
already addressed the issue. Instead, Lucas announced something different for
the moment, at least: a new per se takings rule with a per se nuisance exception.
A total regulatory deprivation of property naturally precludes any profitable
use of the property. It is submitted, nevertheless, that neither the total
proscriptiveness of a regulation nor its foreclosure of any profitable use is
crucial in a regulatory takings case. Profitable operations for the coal industry,
for example, failed to persuade the four dissenting judges in Keystone that its
challenged regulation was valid. Further, the majority justices in Keystone
expressly refused to let the coal communities be turned into shambles in
rejecting the coal industry's claim under the Contract Clause 170 of the Consti-

165Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
166480 U.S. at 484, 493.
167260 U.S. at 414-15.
168

See Rose, supra note 126, at 567 n.38.

169

The Court in Lucas conceded that it is uncertain whether a regulation is a total use
deprivation in some situations. It also admitted that Mahon and Keystone contain
inconsistent pronouncements about this issue. The Court then suggested that resolution
of the question may depend upon how the regulating state's law of property has shaped
the landowner's reasonable expectations of land use. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 100-18.
170

"No state shall.., pass any ...Law impairing the obligation of contracts.... U.S.

CONST. art. L § 10.
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tution, which the industry had also invoked. 171 A court with this perspective
would have hardly let unprofitable mining operations compel a shambles use
of the Takings Clause either.
Moreover, a near total regulatory deprivation of property with a resulting
near total reduction in profitability has been upheld when use of the property
would destroy valid interests of the police power.172 The difference between
total and near total regulatory deprivation of property, in other words, can be
strictly arithmetical. Drastic regulation and reduction of profitability are hardly
new in Takings Clause litigation.173
Similarly, a nuisance exception for a regulation raising a claim under the
Takings Clause is not new.174 For example, the power of the state to suppress
a nuisance appeared in 1922, in Mahon, in Justice Brandeis' sole dissenting
opinion concerning public safety,175 which the majority held could be
adequately protected by giving notice of mining operations. 176 Further, the
entire Court in Keystone expressly discussed a nuisance exception from the
Takings Clause that included the harmful use precedents, although the justices
disagreed by a narrow margin (5-4) about its scope. 177
Consequently, a nuisance, like a harmful use, can depend upon the eye of
the beholder. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia
would likely use the nuisance concept to reduce the state's police power
because they protested the mutilation of Mahon by dissenting in Keystone.178
Justice Thomas may have the same inclination although he has not been on the
Court long enough for his views on the Takings Clause to become known.
Justice White, however, voted with the court majority in both Keystone and
Lucas.179 Therefore, he seems unlikely to agree that the law of nuisance should
severely curtail the police power. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens are set

171Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 504 (1987). The
Contracts Clause does not prevent substantial or even total impairments of private
contracts when such impositions are reasonably appropriate for the effectuation of a
significant and legitimate public purpose. Id. at 504 n.31, 505. Consequently, the
Contracts Clause provides less protection than the Takings Clause.
172
See supra text accompanying notes 62-89 for a discussion of near nuisance
precedents.
173

1d.

174

1d. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 113-14, 120, 130-34.

17SPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922).
176
Id. at 414.
177Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-92, 512-14
(1987).
178
Id. at 507-08.
179

1d. at 472; See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2888

(1992).
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against this use of nuisance doctrine because they dissented in Lucas. 180 Finally,
Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy, in Lucas, refused to agree to the use of
nuisance doctrine to severely contract the police power.181 Therefore, it is
possible that the nuisance component of the Lucasrule will permit an expansive
use of the police power that will permit as much protection for ecological
interests as other regulatory objectives.
It is also possible, however, that there will be a severely restrictive nuisance
limitation upon drastic property regulation. Four justices on the Court may
press hard for the restoration of Mahon and give freedom of private enterprise
a constitutional dimension once again.
VI. DRASTIC

PROPERTY REGULATION: A MARGINAL OR LARGER INCREASE
BEYOND THE COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE

There is already an existing conception of nuisance law in the Supreme Court
precedents that allows regulatory freedom of choice to the state when a use of
property is totally incompatible with another use of property in a particular
locale, and also injurious to some other protectible interest of the police power.
Prohibition of destructive mining practices, brick factories, and cedar trees is
illustrative. 182 Further, this version of what a nuisance is does not always
require total incompatibility. Liquor prohibition, for example, recognizes that
palpable serious loss of life, limb, and health is enough. These interests also fall
within the protective scope of the traditional police power.
Straightforward application of these nuisance precedents would clearly
allow South Carolina to protect its beaches from residential development that
would destroy them. The Lucas majority opinion, however, was less than
straightforward. This hesitation suggests that some or all of the majority
justices think that the existing nuisance precedents would allow the state too
much freedom to address new conditions.
Thus, with the exception of Keystone, about which as little as possible was
said, the Lucas majority merely affirmed the incompatible use precedents
'explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police power. "183 By now,
of course, preventing people and uses from getting in each other's way under
modem living conditions is a traditional exercise of the police power that
permits drastic property regulation.184 The Court might also have included the
validity of restrictions upon the strip mining of coal that are really an invitation

180112 S. Ct. at 2904, 2917.
181

1d. at 2902-03, 2925.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-55,100-22.

182

183112 S. Ct. at 2897.

184The zoning ordinances in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
380-83 (1926) is an example. The zoning ordinance was alleged to have reduced the value
of some land holdings by 75%. Id. at 384.
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to leave all of it in the ground. 185 Strip mining can cause pollution of streams,
soil erosion, and floods, all of which undoubtedly fall within traditional police
186
power regulation.
In the eyes of some or all of the Lucas justices, then, the incompatible use
precedents do not give the state complete regulatory freedom over
incompatible interests. Instead, the Lucas majority leaves open some possibility
that these precedents may rest, or may come to rest, upon antecedent principles
of state nuisance and property law that make the use of property unlawful and
also permit the state to make this unlawfulness explicit when the need to do so
arises. 187 Further, this power, as the Court says, would not allow the state to
totally proscribe a "productive use that was previously permissible under
relevant property and nuisance principles."188 What the Lucas majority leaves
to the future, nevertheless, is the calculus for determining when a once lawful
use becomes a proscribable nuisance, especially for the protection of ecological
interests that traditionally have received destruction instead of the protection
of the police power.
Further, the Court's examples of acceptable drastic property regulation will
be chilling to its exercise if,they are also meant to illustrate limitations beyond
which the state cannot go. Compensation would not be required, for example,
when the state forbade "a landfilling operation that would have the effect of
flooding others' land. "189 Similarly, the state could require the owner of a
nuclear generating plant to move it without compensation when he built it
upon an earthquake fault. 190 The state can also destroy property without
compensation, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent a fire from spreading. 19 1
Turned around as limitations upon state power to drastically prohibit,
however, these illustrations would be capable of letting loose private activity
of considerable destructive magnitude. 192

185Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 269 (1981)
(upholding detailed regulations concerning the restoration of stripmined land).
186

d. at 277.

187112 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
18 8

1d. at 2901.
1 1d. at 2900.
89

190

d.

191

d.

19 2

The Court in Lucas provided the appropriate language by saying:
A law or decree... must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance,
or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that
affect the public generally, or otherwise.
112 S. Ct. at 2900.
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Other portions of the Lucas majority opinion, however, seem to look in the
opposite direction. Thus, the Court said that the total takings inquiry required
will ordinarily involve consideration of the degree of harm presented by the
proscribed use as well as its social utility and the relative ease with which the
harm can be avoided by all concerned, including the regulated party.193 Harm
is still relevant, then, even though elsewhere the Court largely disavowed
harmful use analysis and even expressly said that "noxious-use logic cannot
serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory takings." 194 Finally, the last
footnote in the majority opinion expressly allows a court some leeway in
interpreting state law when it makes a nuisance inquiry.195 Therefore, the Lucas
opinion seems to leave some room for an expansive exercise of the police power
that would let the state adjust new incompatible interests in the same way that
the precedents permit for the incompatibilities of the past.
The basic issue, however, in all of this ambiguity, tension, and contradiction
seems apparent. It is not simply whether the lawfulness of a destructive use of
property over time constitutionalizes it as long as the destructive capacity of
the use remains the same and was always apparent. This was the question that
Mahon answered. The question in Lucas is larger because a use that prevails
under the Takings Clause when it becomes intolerable, as in Mahon, certainly
could not have been proscribed at the outset. One possibility for the rule of
nuisance in Lucas is that a destructive use that is initially not a nuisance is
unlikely ever to become one.

VII. APPLYING THE NUISANCE RULE OF LUCAS ISESSENTIALLY A
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
An inflexible conception of the common law of nuisance would permit only
a marginal expansion of what the common law of nuisance forbids. This
conception of nuisance for determining the permissibility of drastic property
regulation would reduce the police power, taking hard policy choices out of
the hands of the legislature and placing them with the courts. A flexible
conception of common law nuisance, on the other hand, would require the
courts to strike a balance between conflicting interests in the same way that the
legislature acts when it legislates. Either way, the nuisance rule would direct
the courts to do the work of legislatures, subject to Supreme Court supervision.
An inflexible conception of the common law of nuisance for the Lucas rule
is likely to make drastic regulation of many destructive property uses almost
always untimely. State intervention will not be permissible until it is too late.
Harmless uses, naturally, do not require state intervention. But many
potentially destructive uses are not likely to be common law nuisances initially;
therefore, they will become constitutional property rights at the outset. When
disaster is finally at hand and state intervention may become permissible, it
193

1d. at 2901.
1941d. at 2899.
195/d. at 2902 n.18.
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probably will be too little and too late. Moreover, this possible outcome for the
nuisance rule in Lucas would result from legislative harm-balancing that the
rule has already performed in advance.
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon196 and its destructive mining practice
show what is meant. This mining practice might have been acceptable when
provision for it was first made. At the time, there might have been a surplus of
both living space and environment. Under these circumstances, a potentially
destructive mining practice arguably deserved a chance to show whether it
might do much more good than harm, provided the legislature could halt the
practice if it became too destructive. This response might also have been better
than prohibiting the practice initially. It certainly seems preferable to creating
a constitutional right for the practice to begin, and, then, to let it run its course
because the practice never strictly was a common law nuisance.
Similarly, residential development that is potentially destructive of the beach
is likely to be a constitutional right before it can become a nuisance, leaving
little beach to save if catastrophe has to be at hand before state intervention
becomes permissible. The policy choices in such an inflexible rule are obvious.
The rule would give real estate developers and their customers a market-driven
constitutional right to consume the ecological resources of the public.
A flexible rule of common law nuisance, of course, would be much more
protective of these ecological resources, but the protection would really come
from the courts rather than legislatures. A flexible version of the nuisance rule
directs the courts to engage in harm-balancing of conflicting interests. The
process requires weighing the degree of harm from a particular use against its
social utility and the feasibility of controlling the harm with other means than
total suppression. This version of the Lucas rule would invite the courts to
consider what legislatures usually consider when they make hard policy
choices in regulatory practices in real estate markets. 197 Letting legislatures do
what they have traditionally done in regulating land uses, however, seems
preferable to either version of the Lucas rule.
VIII. THE POLICE POWER TO CONTROL GAIN AND Loss IN REAL ESTATE
MARKETS AND LIMITATIONS THEREON
Because someone's gain is also frequently someone else's loss, gain and loss
may be as elusive in the eye of the beholder as benefits conferment and harm
prevention. Gain and loss, however, are what the police power and the land
use precedents are about. The public may want to foreclose private gain,
including investment principal, that will cause public loss unless the public
believes that both the gain and the loss best promote the common good. The
precedents show that the state has this power and should keep it, subject to
minimal judicial oversight. Thus, the state can prescribe the destruction of

196260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19 7See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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198
useful cedar trees when they will inflict loss upon the state's apple industry.
The state can also mandate the shutdown of a brick factory when it will
preclude residential community development. 199 Similarly, the right of a real
estate broker to maximize the industrial development of his land and also his
profit must yield to orderly planned community development when the state
wants the benefits of zoning. 200 The common law of nuisance allowed
helter-skelter land development 20 1 that was thought to result in less land
values, overall, than zoning would provide.202 Dollar loss or cost to the public
power is not limited to
seems apparent in all of these situations, and the police
203
value.
dollar
a
have
that
the protection of interests
There must be limits, naturally, upon state regulatory power to drastically
reduce the value of property. Instead of drastic regulation, accommodation
may occasionally be compelled in resolving a conflict between a land use and
other state interests. Drastic property regulation, for example, should
ordinarily be impermissible when the state's regulatory plan, itself, generally
chooses accommodation rather than drastic regulation to protect state interests.
Thus, for example, the basic premises of zoning regulation do not automatically
justify the shutdown of a previously existing sanitarium in a newly created
residential district. 2° 4 Zoning, after all, does require conflicting uses to meet
each other throughout the zoning plan at the boundary lines of various use
districts. Successful accommodation, however, assumes that one interest will
not destroy or even substantially impair other interests. But many times
accommodation simply will not work; a substantial margin for error is
necessary to secure the interests that the police power protects. Therefore,
accommodation should usually be a matter of legislative discretion when the
potential for conflict between a land use and other interests is real.
Further, the Constitution should forbid drastic property regulation to protect
the remnant of an interest in a particular locale when permitted lawful uses
have almost destroyed the interest. Real estate developers, naturally, must have
the right to drive away the field mice when they turn rural acreage into a new
town. The right, however, arguably does not include the right to extinguish a
20
species. 5

198

Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).

199

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
201
/d. at 392-93.
20 0

202DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND

LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, § 3.13 at 62 (2d ed. 1986).
203Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26,
32-33 (1954).
204 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17,19,22 (Cal. 1931).
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See supra text pp. 52-53; see infra text pp. 50-51.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

25

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:31

The news media frequently reports episodes about residential development
along the seashore and lakeshore and its incompatibility with the existence of
beach areas. Apparently, the erosive impact of residential development in some
locales can devour beach areas and thereby foreclose all rights in them,
including rights of access and use by the public. This loss may also increase the
precariousness of endangered or threatened species. The Lucas nuisance
rationale does not yet give landowners a constitutional right to inflict
destruction of this magnitude upon the ecological resources of the public. 206
Moreover, the protective capacity of the police power would easily be large
enough to prevent these losses if public ecological resources receive the same
degree of protection that traditional subject matter of the police power has
received.
IX. CONCLUSION - LUCAS AND THE ATLANTIC BEACHES

What the Lucas rule will mean for the Atlantic beaches is uncertain at the
moment. Lucas, himself, owned two of the last four vacant lots in a subdivision
on a barrier island where extensive residential development had already
occurred. 207 Whatever harm from residential development the police power
might have prevented on the island may have already occurred or have been
set in motion irreversibly. Other stretches of uninhabited beach must remain,
however. Some of them may have residential subdivisions with primarily
unoccupied lots. Others may have tracts of high market value that await
subdivision. It may still be possible to stop the construction of houses on these
parts of the beach.
The peculiar turn of events in the Lucas litigation, precluded any factual
determination of the destructive capacity of residential construction in beach
areas. Essentially, in the trial court, Lucas said that determination of this
destructive capacity did not make any difference because the regulatory
deprivation of his property was total; therefore, he was entitled to
compensation, even though improving his lots might present a risk to
protectible state interests on the barrier island.20 8 The trial court agreed with
Lucas.209 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina disagreed and
reversed the trial court. 210 Then, the United States Supreme Court rendered
corrective judgment. 211 Consequently, the determination of harm to the
beaches will occur after remand in Lucas or in another case.
The determination may not occur in the Lucas litigation at all. After oral
argument, but before decision in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the state
206
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amended its Beachfront Management Act to allow the issuance of special
permits. 212 The amendment may well accommodate Lucas, 213 rescind any
permanent taking that the unamended act might have effectuated, 214 and
2 15
reduce Lucas' claim to one of total temporary taking.
This posture of the case, however, may foreclose any compensation for Lucas
altogether. His lots were escalating in value so rapidly during the trial that he
might have had no intention of developing them pending the outcome of this
lawsuit.2 16 Planned deliberate idleness for the use of land, naturally, is not an
2 17
injury that is cognizable under the Takings Clause.
Moreover, state administrative procedures may have been available to
Lucas, and use of them probably would have altered or resolved the case. In
addition to the provision for a permit under the amended Beachfront
Management Act,2 18 a state administrative remedy might also have provided
a permit.219 The issuance of a permit, of course, would have eliminated the
claim for a total permanent taking.220 Similarly, any planned idleness for Lucas'
2 21
lots would have foreclosed compensation for any total temporary taking.
Certain development plans for the lots, on the other hand, would have
presented a case that probably would have included evidence of specific harm
to the beach from residential development. The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, expressly refused a request to require use of state permit or other
administrative procedures. 222 The United States Supreme Court held that this
disposition of the administrative issues foreclosed Lucas' claim for
compensation for a total temporary taking.223 It then proceeded to hear and
decide the case as it had been presented. 224 Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court's
new rule in Lucas would have been more informed if the record had disclosed
how much loss residential development in beach areas can cause. The Court,

212112 S. Ct. at 2890-91.
213

1d. at 2891-92.

214

1d. at 2891-92, 2907; see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,321 (1987).

215112 S. Ct. at 2891.
216

Id. at 2902, 2907-08, 2917.
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1 1d. at 2891-92 n.3, 2902, 2907-08, 2917.
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Id. at 2890-91, 2907.
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1 1d. at 2907.

220112 S. Ct. at 2891, 2892 n.4.
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1d. at 2891-92 n.3, 2902, 2907-08.
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1d. at 2891. Ordinarily, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for a decision until
exhaustion of permit and variance procedures disclose the extent of the deprivation; Id.
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however, decided to change the applicable rule, or at least its emphasis, for
cases of total regulatory deprivation. Unlike the Court's rule in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,225 which
appeared to require compensation for a total regulatory deprivation only if it
did not further an objective of the police power,226 the Lucas rule is quite
different.
Perhaps the Lucas Court wanted to set a new course without having to
subject Lucas to another round of trial and appellate litigation before making
the announcement. In any event, the Court succeeded in doing what it wanted
to do in Lucas. The future will reveal what this is, and the Court's newly minted
rule for the permissible constitutional protection of public ecological resources
may prove as protectively fragile as the practices of the real estate industry
itself.

225482 U.S. 304 (1987).
226

See supra

text accompanying notes 17-26.
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